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1 Introduction
The need to improve the euro area financial 
architecture to make it less vulnerable to crises 
and to deliver long-term prosperity to all its 
members remains as strong as ever. Nevertheless, 
no meaningful reform has been enacted since the 
Single Resolution Mechanism was created in July 
2014 as part of the banking union initiated in 2012. 
This reflects a deep disagreement among euro area 
members on the direction that reforms should 
take – including between its two largest members, 
Germany and France. France (along with other 
members such as Italy) has called for additional 
stabilisation and risk-sharing mechanisms as well 
as stronger governance and accountability at the 
euro area level. In contrast, Germany (along with 
other members such as the Netherlands) takes 
the view that the problems of the euro area stem 
mostly from inadequate domestic policies, that 
additional euro area stabilisation and risk-sharing 
instruments could be counterproductive, and that 
what is really needed is tougher enforcement of 
fiscal rules and more market discipline.
This Policy Insight was written by a group of 
independent French and German economists with 
differing views and political sensitivities but a 
shared conviction that the current deadlock must 
be overcome. Reform of the euro area is needed 
for three reasons: first, to reduce the continued 
vulnerability of the euro area to financial instability; 
second, to provide governments with incentives 
that both encourage prudent macroeconomic 
policies and deliver growth-enhancing domestic 
reform; third – and perhaps most importantly – to 
remove a continuing source of division between 
euro area members and of resentment of European 
institutions such as the European Commission 
and the ECB, which has contributed to the rise of 
anti-euro populism and which could eventually 
threaten the European project itself. 
We start from the premise that both the French and 
German positions have a point. To make progress, 
the major concerns of both sides need to be 
addressed. The challenge is to do so without ending 
up with a collection of half-baked compromises. 
This requires a shift in the euro area’s approach to 
reconcile fiscal prudence with demand policies, 
and rules with policy discretion. The current 
approach to fiscal discipline – an attempt to micro-
manage domestic policies through complex and 
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often divisive fiscal rules – needs to be replaced 
by a combination of streamlined rules, stronger 
institutions, and market-based incentives, with the 
aim of strengthening national responsibility.
Creating such incentives requires a credible 
application of the no bailout rule of the European 
treaty. Countries with unsustainable debt levels 
should not expect, and not be expected, to 
receive fiscal assistance – whether through the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or any 
other mechanism — unless they restructure 
their debts. But this requires an environment 
in which debt restructuring becomes feasible 
without large collateral economic damage. In turn, 
this necessitates more effective euro area-level 
protection of the viable part of the financial sector, 
fire-walls, stronger macroeconomic stabilisation, 
more predictable liquidity support when needed, 
and more risk sharing – through both private and 
fiscal channels. 
In short: the central argument of this Policy Insight 
is that market discipline and risk sharing should be 
viewed as complementary pillars of the euro area 
financial architecture, rather than as substitutes. 
Achieving this complementarity, however, is 
not easy. It calls for stabilisation and insurance 
mechanisms that are both effective and cannot 
give rise to permanent transfers. And it requires 
a reformed institutional framework. It is in these 
areas that we hope to contribute.
Our contribution is confined to an essential but 
relatively narrow public good: macroeconomic, 
financial and fiscal stability. An important related 
question concerns the other public goods that a 
politically viable euro area must deliver to its 
citizens. Which of these public goods belongs to 
the euro area remit – as opposed to the EU remit or 
to that of particular countries – requires political 
judgement which is outside the scope of this Policy 
Insight. By the same token, we do not discuss 
the possibility of a euro area budget. Whereas a 
common budget could have desirable stabilisation 
properties, no budget has ever been created mainly 
for macroeconomic stabilisation purposes. A 
proper budget could only grow out of political 
decisions to finance defined common public goods 
and to design an institutional framework ensuring 
adequate accountability to a legislative body. This 
is why, although highly relevant, such issues are 
not addressed in this Insight – nor their deeper 
political implications, namely, to what extent a 
monetary union should develop into a political 
union. 
The following section explains why the euro area 
remains fragile, and why the case for a reform of 
the euro area architecture is strong, despite the 
ongoing economic recovery. We next lay out the 
argument for a shift in the fiscal and financial 
governance of the euro area and the areas for 
which this has implications. This is followed by a 
set of specific proposals. 
2 A euro area that remains 
vulnerable, underperforming and 
divided 
Notwithstanding its recent cyclical recovery, the 
euro area continues to be financially vulnerable, 
is likely to underperform with respect to long-
term growth, suffers deep political divisions, 
and is increasingly challenged by populist and 
nationalist movements. While these problems 
have many causes, a poorly designed fiscal and 
financial architecture is an important contributor 
to all of them.
First, the euro area continues to face significant 
financial fragility and limited institutional capacity 
to deal with a new crisis. Stabilisation and recovery 
have relied mainly on monetary easing by the 
ECB. At the same time, legacies of the global and 
euro area crises remain, including high sovereign 
debt, high stocks of non-performing loans in some 
countries, and high exposure of many banks to the 
debts of their own governments. As price stability 
is gradually restored, the ECB will remove stimulus, 
and interest rates will rise, making it more difficult 
to grow out of debt. Renewed difficulties in the 
sovereign debt market could promptly translate 
into difficulties for the financial system, and 
hence the real economy. Conversely, the public 
safety net for banks, including deposit insurance, 
remains primarily at the national level, creating 
scope for contagion from banking sector fragility 
to national sovereign debt distress. Five years 
after the leaders of the euro area claimed that it 
was imperative to break the ‘doom loop’ between 
banks and sovereigns, that vicious circle still poses 
a major threat to individual member states and 
all of the euro area.2 The capacity of the ECB to 
provide a bulwark against this and other crisis risks 
is limited, because it may affect member countries 
asymmetrically and because the central bank may 
not have enough room for additional monetary 
easing. Fiscal policy, in turn, remains constrained 
by both high debts and the poor design of European 
fiscal rules. 
Second, the euro area lacks adequate institutional 
conditions and incentives for long-term prosperity. 
Incomplete banking union and fragmented capital 
markets prevent it from achieving full monetary 
and financial integration, which would boost both 
growth and stability. Its instruments for promoting 
sound domestic policies are not effective. This is 
2  This vicious circle is sometimes also referred to as the 
‘diabolic loop’ and the ‘sovereign-bank nexus’; see Mody 
(2009), Gerlach et al. (2010), Brunnermeier et al. (2011), 
Acharya et al. (2014), and Farhi and Tirole (2017).
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true for the fiscal rules embedded in the Stability 
and Growth Pact, which both lack teeth in 
good times and flexibility in bad times, and the 
‘macroeconomic imbalance procedure’ aiming to 
prevent the build-up of lasting external surpluses 
and deficits and encourage growth- and stability-
enhancing reforms, which has been largely 
ineffective since its inception. The incentives that 
ultimately underpin these rules and procedures 
– financial penalties – are generally not credible, 
in part because they serve no purpose other than 
penalisation, and can be counterproductive both 
politically and economically.  
Third, and perhaps most worrisome, the flaws of 
the euro area’s fiscal architecture have given rise to 
political problems. This has to do partly with the 
poor design and complexity of the EU’s fiscal rules 
and partly with the euro area’s inability to deal 
with insolvent countries other than through crisis 
loans conditioned on harsh fiscal adjustment. 
The latter has produced misery in crisis countries 
and contributed to a flight to political extremes, 
fuelling nationalist and populist movements in 
many euro area countries – including creditor 
countries, where there are concerns that risky 
loans will turn into transfers. The former has put 
the European Commission in the difficult position 
of enforcing a highly complex and error-prone 
system, exposing it to criticism from both sides. At 
the same time, the rise of populism and nationalism 
makes a policy system that relies on centralised 
micro-management increasingly hard to manage. 
Enforcement of EU fiscal and macroeconomic rules 
requires a shared respect of procedures. 
The next euro area crisis may still be years away. 
But when it returns, perhaps on the occasion of 
the next cyclical downturn, it could come with 
a vengeance. While current European rules and 
procedures are not effective enough to reduce 
current vulnerabilities and prevent new ones, 
they sow divisions and fuel populism. Unless 
they improve, the next crisis will hit at a time 
when the EMU’s political capital and trust among 
participating countries are lower than in 2008. And 
unless the euro area’s crisis mitigation tools are 
reformed in the meantime, the crisis will be painful 
and divisive, because the main instrument to deal 
with it will again be a combination of large-scale 
crisis lending combined with prolonged austerity, 
leading to further resentment in both creditor and 
debtor countries.
3 A balanced solution: Combining 
risk sharing with better incentives
One side of the current reform debate is focused 
on crisis mitigation, arguing for better stabilisation 
and risk-sharing instruments at the euro area level 
and rules that allow domestic policies greater 
flexibility. The other side is focused on crisis 
prevention, arguing for stronger incentives to 
induce prudence at the domestic levels and force 
countries to help themselves, including through 
reforms that may raise long-term growth. In that 
view, flexibility should be taken away from the 
domestic level and risk sharing reduced at the 
euro area level. It is the seeming irreconcilability 
of these positions that has produced the present 
deadlock on euro area reform.
A choice between crisis mitigation and crisis 
prevention is generally a false alternative. The policy 
regime should provide both. No crisis prevention 
system can be safe enough to eliminate the need 
for crisis mitigation; and no crisis mitigation tool 
can be powerful enough to dispense from crisis 
prevention. 
To break the deadlock, however, it is important to 
begin by recognising that trade-offs between risk-
sharing arrangements and good policies exist and 
can, in fact, be a serious problem. A euro area federal 
budget with public investment responsibilities but 
without effective control of national-level spending 
would be an invitation for national authorities to 
free-ride, either by neglecting their own spending 
responsibilities or by running up large debts, in the 
hope that the federal level will bail them out. A fully 
mutualised European deposit insurance system 
could be abused by governments that can force or 
nudge domestic banks to grant them preferential 
credit conditions by using their access to deposit 
funding. A European unemployment insurance 
based on unemployment levels could result in 
systematic transfers to countries with higher 
unemployment levels, undercutting incentives 
for labour market reform. And ESM assistance to 
countries with unsustainable debts would amount 
to redistribution from both the European and 
national taxpayer – who bears the costs of austerity 
– benefitting private holders of sovereign debt and 
encouraging future lending booms to countries 
with unsustainable policies.
However, this is not the whole story, both because 
safety nets can be designed to ameliorate these 
trade-offs, and because effective market discipline 
may require some risk sharing, as well as effective 
fire-walls:        
First, it is possible to design risk-sharing arrangements 
that minimise, or even remove, the trade-off 
between crisis prevention and mitigation. One such 
strategy is to make support conditional on the 
implementation of good policies, including by 
applying conditionality ex ante (that is, based on 
policies or the state of the economy before the 
crisis) rather than just ex post. Another strategy is 
to define the event that triggers support in a way 
that makes it very hard to manipulate through 
policies. It is also desirable to require that a 
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country has ‘skin in the game’ and bear a cost as 
a condition for receiving support. Using insurance 
terminology, this is analogous either to requiring 
a ‘co-payment’, or to offering only catastrophic 
risk (re-)insurance, so that the ‘first loss’ is always 
borne by the insured itself. An additional approach 
consists in private risk-sharing arrangements, 
particularly through more deeply integrated 
banking and capital markets. Euro area citizens and 
corporations should be able to hold their savings 
in instruments whose returns are independent of 
unemployment or output declines in their home 
country. Provided these markets are well-regulated 
and supervised, such arrangements would not lead 
to any transfers except between the consenting 
parties to such financial contracts.
Second, risk-sharing and stabilisation instruments 
are necessary for effective discipline. To see this 
point, consider the event of sovereign debt crises 
in the euro area. The current crisis mitigation 
architecture, as laid out in the ESM treaty, envisages 
debt restructuring for countries with unsustainable 
sovereign debts and conditional crisis lending 
for all others. However, even successful debt-
restructuring operations are usually associated with 
large economic dislocations, both because they 
have an impact on financial institutions directly 
and indirectly exposed to the sovereign, and 
because they trigger uncertainty and capital flight. 
This makes it more likely that restructuring will 
either be postponed – usually at great economic 
cost – until there is no alternative, or replaced by 
an official bailout at the expense of taxpayers in 
both creditor and debtor countries. To make early 
debt restructurings more credible, it is essential to 
reduce their economic costs and contagion effects 
to other countries. This requires limiting the direct 
exposures of banks to their domestic sovereigns, 
ensuring that confidence in the financial system 
– including in the protection of deposits – is 
maintained, and helping countries get through a 
cyclical downturn triggered by collapses in private 
investment linked to crisis-related uncertainty. Just 
hardening the rules is not enough; in the European 
context, even the hardest rule will not be credible 
if its implementation leads to chaos, contagion 
and the threat of euro area break-up. 
Third, in the presence of high legacy debts, market 
discipline can backfire unless effective risk-sharing 
arrangements are put in place at the same time. 
This was the lesson of the ‘Deauville beach walk’ 
in October 2010, after which President Nicolas 
Sarkozy of France and Chancellor Angela Merkel of 
Germany announced their intention to establish a 
European mechanism that would ensure adequate 
“private sector involvement” in European debt 
crises “by 2013”.  The intentions of the two leaders 
– to strengthen market discipline by creating a 
debt restructuring mechanism – may have been 
laudable, but the contagion effects were costly: 
sovereign spreads rose sharply in several euro 
area countries, triggering loss of market access 
in Ireland, soon followed by Portugal. The main 
lesson is that the ‘transition problem’ – getting 
to a state of more effective market discipline and 
higher stability without triggering a crisis on the 
way – needs to be firmly recognised and addressed 
in proposals to raise market discipline. 
Based on the logic of the preceding paragraphs, 
the proposals outlined in the next sections are 
an attempt to simultaneously improve discipline 
and risk sharing in the euro area. Reflecting the 
fact that crises can have both financial and fiscal 
causes and that disturbances in both sectors can 
reinforce each other, they focus on financial 
and fiscal architecture, as well as institutional 
reforms to make euro area surveillance and crisis 
management more legitimate and effective:
• Reform of the financial sector architecture
 ◦ Strengthening the credibility of mechanisms to 
bail in creditors of failing banks
 ◦ Reducing the home bias in sovereign exposures of 
banks through regulatory disincentives, without 
causing disruption to either sovereigns or banks 
 ◦ Ensuring equal protection of insured deposits 
throughout the euro area, even in crisis-struck 
countries
 ◦ Deepening cross-border financial integration 
through the banking system and capital markets, 
to allow more risk sharing based on private 
contracts
• Reform of the fiscal architecture
 ◦ Reforming fiscal rules to make them less pro-
cyclical, increase national ‘ownership’, and 
make them easier to enforce
 ◦ Creating the legal and institutional preconditions 
for restructuring unsustainable sovereign debt 
while preserving financial stability
 ◦ Expanding fiscal stabilisation options in a 
way that creates good incentives for national 
economic policy 
 ◦ Exploring a euro area-level ‘safe asset’ that could 
be scaled up in conjunction with the regulatory 
incentives to reduce the home bias of banks
• Reform of the institutional architecture
 ◦ Separating the role of the surveillance watchdog 
and political decision-maker by either creating 
an independent watchdog within the European 
Commission or by moving the watchdog role 
outside the Commission
 ◦ Assigning the responsibility for conditional crisis 
lending fully to a crisis management institution 
built on the current ESM, with an appropriate 
accountability structure 
These proposals should be viewed as a package that 
largely requires joint implementation. This is true 
for obvious political reasons – the purpose is to 
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break a deadlock – but also for reasons of economic 
logic. First, both crisis mitigation and crisis 
prevention continue to be a problem in the euro 
area; hence, a balanced approach would be required 
even if there were no complementarities between 
proposals to address each set of issues. Second, 
complementarities are in fact present: weakening 
one side (risk sharing) would compromise the other 
(discipline). Third, moving to higher discipline in 
a context of high legacy vulnerabilities can trigger 
crisis risks unless it is part of a broader strategy in 
which these risks are recognised and mitigated. 
Applying this logic, one can distinguish three 
reform ‘packages’ within which complementarities 
are particularly strong. First, the first three 
bullets related to financial sector reform (that 
is, risk-reduction measures together with a 
specific approach to establish a European deposit 
insurance system, described in detail below). 
Second, the reform of fiscal rules (first bullet 
in fiscal architecture) together with stronger 
and more independent fiscal watchdogs at 
both national and European levels (first bullet, 
institutional architecture), since the latter are 
required to make the proposed rules credible. 
Third, better legal and institutional conditions 
for debt restructuring as a last resort, better fiscal 
and private risk-sharing arrangements, and the 
institutional strengthening of the ESM (second, 
third and fourth bullets in fiscal architecture, the 
fourth bullet in financial as well as both bullets in 
institutional architecture). Importantly, however, 
there are also complementarities across these 
packages. Sovereign debt restructuring – part of the 
third package – requires the implementation of the 
first package for credibility and stability reasons. 
Conversely, the first package would benefit from 
the implementation of the second and third, 
since the reduction of fiscal risks contributes to 
reducing risks in the financial sector. Hence, all 
three packages should ideally be implemented in 
parallel.
4 A blueprint for reform
4.1 Financial sector architecture
A well-functioning monetary union both enables 
and ultimately requires an integrated financial 
market and financial intermediaries whose cross-
border development is not hindered by national 
borders. This integration in turn requires common 
regulatory and supervisory institutions. The lack of 
such an architecture was both a contributing cause 
of the 2010-2012 euro area crisis and hampered 
the crisis response. This motivated the decision, 
by European heads of state and government in 
June 2012, to launch the creation of a European 
banking union. 
Financial sector reforms since the height of the 
euro area crisis have been significant but have not 
come far enough. The effort to bring the banking 
sector back to soundness (referred to as ‘risk 
reduction’ in the policy debate) is well underway 
but unfinished. Its continuation is crucial to 
establishing the trust necessary for the next major 
policy steps, including further risk sharing. These 
should address the core linkages at the root of 
the doom loop, by ensuring that future sovereign 
debt restructurings will not automatically trigger 
banking panics, and conversely, that future large-
scale banking crises will not automatically trigger 
sovereign debt distress. As developed below, that 
means strengthening the bank resolution regime, 
reducing the exposures of banks to their domestic 
sovereigns, creating a European deposit insurance 
scheme, and removing disincentives to the 
geographic diversification of banks beyond their 
home country. In the longer term, capital market 
integration is necessary to improve the financial 
system’s ability to absorb asymmetrical shocks.
This section outlines a substantial financial reform 
agenda, on top of significant other reforms in 
that area that have been recently implemented 
or are in the process of legislative discussion or 
implementation. In light of complaints (not least 
from financial firms themselves) about reform 
fatigue, it may be argued that now is not the time 
to initiate a new effort. However, the banking 
union, in its current unfinished state, is too fragile 
and at risk of being reversed. The bank-sovereign 
vicious circle nearly led to the break-up of the euro 
area in 2011-12, and remains deeply entrenched 
even after the encouraging early development 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and 
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) (Battistini et 
al., 2014; Brutti and Sauré, 2016). Furthermore, the 
current benign economic environment in the euro 
area provides a near-ideal context for ambitious 
financial sector reform, and the corresponding 
window of opportunity must not be wasted. 
Here, as elsewhere, the key to success is to ensure 
that risk reduction, market discipline, and risk 
sharing go hand in hand. Proposals in one area 
will often not be feasible – or not even desirable 
– without progress in the others. Policymakers 
should accelerate the effort to de-risk the 
banking sector, in particular by solving the non-
performing loan (NPL) problem, strengthening 
bank resolution, reducing incentives for sovereign 
concentration risk, and adopting a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). These elements 
form the core of our proposed reforms. They 
require specific arrangements to mitigate risks 
during the transition, which may be stretched over 
several years. Yet, the key decisions in this area can 
and should all be taken in 2018.
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4.1.1 Finishing the task of restoring banking sector 
soundness
The progress achieved since 2012 in de-risking the 
euro area banking sector is significant, with banks’ 
capitalisation much higher than before the crisis. 
Lingering problems are increasingly at the level of 
individual banks rather than entire countries (with 
the exception of Greece, which is still under an 
assistance programme, and Cyprus). In Portugal, 
all significant banks have been either strengthened 
or sold, and the ‘de-zombification’ of the system 
has contributed to the incipient recovery.  In Spain, 
the banking sector was restructured under an ESM 
programme initiated specifically for this purpose. 
In Italy, however, the banking sector is still under 
strain. But even there, the successful capital raising 
of UniCredit a year ago demonstrates that well-
managed banks suffer no intrinsic limitations 
to their equity market access. Weak significant 
banks have either been closed (Banca Popolare 
di Vicenza, Veneto Banca), nationalised (Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena), or forced to recapitalise 
even if that implied a major dilution of existing 
shareholders (an ongoing process at Carige). This 
has contributed to substantially reducing the stock 
of NPLs in the Italian banking sector. The market 
for bank NPLs is increasingly active, disproving 
claims of an extensive market failure that would 
require massive public intervention, such as a 
pan-European bad bank, which we view as neither 
desirable nor necessary. 
4.1.1.1 Accelerating the clean-up of banks’ balance 
sheets
Even so, NPLs are not being reduced as quickly as 
desirable, and their outstanding volume remains 
large. The primary instrument to reduce the 
stock of NPLs is stronger supervisory pressure. For 
significant institutions (SIs), this is largely in the 
hands of ECB Banking Supervision, even though 
national authorities should also be supportive of 
that effort. ECB Banking Supervision has tended 
to internalise national political constraints, for 
example, by waiting until after the December 2016 
Italian referendum on constitutional reform to 
take decisive action on Monte dei Paschi and the 
two Veneto banks. This was understandable given 
the difficult Italian environment, but ultimately at 
odds with the vision of an independent supervisor. 
At the current juncture, Italy and other member 
states are no longer at immediate risk of systemic 
turmoil, and supervisory forbearance would be 
even less justified than a year or two ago. 
For smaller banks, or less-significant institutions 
(LSIs), the supervisory system remains fragmented, 
raising doubts about its effectiveness. LSIs are 
not supervised by ECB Banking Supervision 
on an ongoing basis, but the ECB has ultimate 
responsibility for their soundness – and is the 
sole authority to revoke their banking licenses. 
In particular, there is a widespread perception 
of fragility of Italian LSIs, which the ECB should 
actively dispel.3 
Overall, it is important that European leaders and 
the public are reassured in the course of 2018 
that legacy NPLs are being firmly addressed. For 
all institutions (SIs and LSIs), supervisors should 
increase the pressure to reduce existing NPLs, based 
on credible valuation standards, and to provision 
new ones appropriately. Otherwise, the trust deficit 
will prevent critically needed progress on breaking 
the doom loop as we suggest below. 
4.1.1.2 Improving the framework for bank crisis 
management and resolution
Lessons should be drawn from the first cases of 
euro area bank crisis resolution under the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) in the 
course of 2017, including the above-mentioned 
Italian banks and Spain’s Banco Popular. The 
comprehensive reimbursement of all senior 
creditors of the two Veneto banks may have been 
technically compliant with both the BRRD and 
state aid requirements, but this very observation 
shows that the policy effort to move from bailout 
to bail-in still has some way to go. 
Five separate reforms should be completed in 
this respect: (1) a revision of the SRM regulation 
to give the SRB direct authority for the execution 
of bank resolution schemes, not just their design 
as is currently the case; (2) a tightening of the 
European Commission’s stance on state aid control 
in the banking sector;4 (3) a requirement that 
any future cases of precautionary recapitalisation 
should include a full asset quality review and stress 
test, unless made impossible by considerations of 
emergency;5 (4) a long-term effort to harmonise 
and ultimately unify bank insolvency law in 
the banking union, phasing out idiosyncratic 
national crisis-management regimes that allow 
for circumvention of the intent of BRRD; and 
finally (5) the architecture of the SRM should 
3 As of mid-2016, LSIs represented 18%  of Italian banks’ 
total assets (source: https://www.bancaditalia.it/media/
approfondimenti/2016/less-significant/less-significant-
institutions-en.pdf?language_id=1). 
4  The currently applicable Banking Communication, which 
was published in July 2013, includes (paragraph 6) an 
assessment of general applicability of Article 107(3)(b) of 
the Treaty, i.e. the possibility to use state aid to remedy a 
serious disturbance in the economy of a member state. In 
the future, this exception should no longer be generally 
presumed, but be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In 
cases where there is no “serious disturbance”, all relevant 
instruments would be bailed in, including senior debt and 
uninsured deposits, as has been the practice in Denmark 
since 2010. 
5  In the case of Monte dei Paschi di Siena, ECB Banking 
Supervision did not conduct an asset quality review prior 
to the precautionary recapitalisation, even though it would 
arguably have had enough time to do so. 
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be completed with the granting by the ESM of 
a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), 
in line with the ECOFIN statement on an SRF 
backstop of December 2013.
4.1.1.3 Improving the single rulebook
Bank regulatory standards should simultaneously 
be tightened and further harmonised, beyond 
the banking legislative package currently under 
discussion. A greater effort should be made to 
eliminate prudential regulatory options and 
national discretion (as has been proposed by the 
ECB), or at least fully transfer their consideration 
to supervisors so that the SSM is legally empowered 
to achieve the required convergence. The EU legal 
framework should be made more compliant with 
the Basel standards, in areas that include the 
definition of capital and the capital treatment of 
insurance operations (namely, a repeal of the so-
called Danish compromise).6 Auditing standards 
and supervision should be tightened to increase 
audit quality.7 Mandatory standards on minimum 
requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities 
(MREL) and, for the largest banks, total loss-
absorbing capacity (TLAC), should be finalised and 
enforced. 
4.1.2 Breaking the doom loop for good
The (unfinished) shift from national bailout to 
bail-in in the handling of banking crises, embodied 
in the BRRD legislation, has somewhat weakened 
the bank-sovereign vicious circle. But it is very 
far from having ‘broken’ it, as has been the stated 
intention of euro area leaders since their landmark 
declaration of 29 June 2012. As with other reform 
aims covered in this Policy Insight, this can only 
be achieved with a balance of market discipline 
and risk sharing. The main disciplining initiative is 
to prevent national governments from using ‘their’ 
domestic banking systems for non-commercial 
purposes of national economic policy (or financial 
repression), through a regulation that penalises 
concentrated sovereign exposures. The main risk-
sharing item is to protect all insured deposits 
equally across the euro area. 
4.1.2.1 Eliminating the home bias in sovereign 
exposures
To reduce home bias, bank regulation should 
create incentives to reduce concentrated exposures 
to specific sovereigns. One option would be to 
6  This refers to the possible double-counting of the regulatory 
capital of a diversified financial group’s insurance operations 
at the consolidated level, a deviation from the global 
Basel III framework that was endorsed under the Danish 
Presidency of the Council in 2012. 
7  This objective is not specific to the financial sector but is 
particularly critical for banks, as their financial reporting 
involves more judgment and modelling than many other 
companies, and is a key basis for prudential supervision. 
introduce ‘sovereign concentration charges’ which 
would require euro area banks holding sovereign 
exposures to any euro area country in excess of a 
threshold of, say, a third of their tier-one capital to 
hold additional capital.8  
A mandatory (in the Basel jargon, Pillar 1) 
regulatory instrument of this type was considered 
in earlier discussions, particularly during the 
Dutch Presidency of the Council in early 2016 and 
in a high-level working group of the EU Economic 
and Financial Committee (EFC), but no consensus 
was found at the time. To make its adoption 
achievable, it should be untied from the separate 
issue of sovereign credit risk-weighting (which is 
not specific to the euro area)9 and focused on the 
issue of concentration risk: in a monetary union, 
in which there is no exchange rate risk, banks can 
and should diversify their exposures away from 
their home country and include bonds of other 
members of the monetary union in their asset 
portfolio. The European Commission should make 
a legislative proposal in this regard with the same 
level of specificity as it did in 2015 with respect to 
EDIS. 
The diversification of banks’ sovereign exposures is 
not merely a matter of handling the crisis legacy, 
or a risk reduction from its current level associated 
with high sovereign debt ratios. It should rather 
be viewed as a structural change, in which the 
loss of the specific role of national banking sectors 
as default absorbers of domestic sovereign debt10 
is more than offset by the resilience gains from a 
well-designed EDIS and the corresponding sharp 
reduction of redenomination risk. 
Any change in the regulatory treatment of sovereign 
exposures carries the risk of changes in relative 
yields during a transition period in which banks 
realign their exposures. Compared to proposals 
that penalise sovereign holdings per se, this risk 
is lower in the approach proposed here, since 
this would incentivise diversification rather than 
the reduction of sovereign bond holdings in the 
aggregate.  Nonetheless, given high sovereign debt 
levels and sovereign exposures, utmost care must 
8  This differs from either sovereign risk weighting or applying 
large exposure limits (e.g. 25% of tier one capital); see Véron 
(2017) for a detailed proposal. 
9  The regulatory framework allows to address sovereign credit 
risk through other instruments. Notwithstanding the Basel 
Committee’s recent failure to reach a global consensus on 
sovereign risk-weighting, the mitigation of sovereign credit 
risk can be improved in the euro area and the rest of the 
EU through better disclosures of sovereign exposures and 
Pillar 2 (bank-specific) requirements that take into account 
market developments. In addition, credit risk-weights 
could be introduced for riskier junior sovereign bonds, as 
proposed below as a way of enforcing revamped fiscal rules. 
10  Depending on circumstances, this specific role can 
contribute to the absorption of sovereign debt market 
shocks or to their amplification. On the drivers of the home 
bias in euro area sovereign exposures, see Altavilla et al. 
(2017) and Ongena et al. (2016). 
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be exercised to prevent financial disruptions during 
the transition period. The purpose of introducing 
concentration charges is not to incentivise bank 
divestment away from the securities issued by the 
most indebted countries. It is, rather, to protect all 
banks, and the financial system as a whole, from 
the possible consequences of disruptions on the 
government bond market of their home countries. 
One option for the transition would be to keep the 
calibration of the concentration charges relatively 
mild, possibly combined with ‘grandfathering’ of 
all already outstanding debt instruments, and a 
very gradual phasing-in of the permanent regime.11 
Alternatively, a higher calibration and/or shorter 
transitional arrangements could be envisaged 
together with the simultaneous introduction of a 
European ‘safe asset’ – for example, senior securities 
backed by diversified pools of sovereign bonds – 
that would be exempted from the concentration 
charges altogether. The case for a European safe 
asset – and potential pitfalls, which its design 
would need to address – is examined in more detail 
below.  
4.1.2.2 Protecting all deposits equally
A European deposit insurance system should be 
implemented in a way that unambiguously creates 
equal protection for all insured euro area depositors 
and precludes geographical ring-fencing.12 For 
these reasons, it should be managed by a single 
authority at the European level.13 At the same 
time, so long as some sources of risk remain under 
the control of national authorities, some elements 
of the system will need to be differentiated across 
countries, as follows: 
• First, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
(EDIS) should maintain sound incentives for 
national governments by pricing country-
specific risk in the calculation of insurance 
premiums. This national component would be 
based on structural indicators of creditor rights, 
such as the effectiveness of insolvency and 
foreclosure processes. 
• Second, in the spirit of a re-insurance system, 
losses should first be borne by the relevant 
‘national compartment’ of EDIS, while 
11  Grandfathering would consist of exempting all exposures 
issued before a given cut-off date from the corresponding 
calculation. This option is the one recommended in Véron 
(2017). 
12  Geographical ring-fencing refers to capital and/or liquidity 
requirements imposed by the SSM or national authorities 
on specific entities within a banking group, in addition 
to the requirements at the consolidated group level. Such 
country-specific requirements within the euro area are an 
obstacle to cross-border integration of the banking system, 
and ultimately antithetic to the banking union. 
13  This authority could be entrusted to the SRB, with due 
operational adjustments in order to enable it to credibly 
provide deposit insurance in all euro area countries. 
common funds (either a separate mutualised 
compartment, or all other compartments 
jointly) can be tapped only in large, systemic 
crises which overburden one or several national 
compartment(s).  
Notwithstanding this differentiation, the 
system would be under a single institutional 
framework, and the insurance itself should be fully 
unconditional to ensure trust. Separate national 
deposit insurance institutions would be phased 
out by the EDIS legislation, but unlike for the SRF, 
the national compartments would be kept in the 
steady state. Separate collective deposit insurance 
schemes (e.g. associated with national or cross-
border institutional protection schemes) could be 
treated as separate compartments, on a case-by-
case basis under general criteria to be set to deter 
abuses. 
The EDIS system should in turn be backstopped by 
the ESM, like the SRF. An asset quality review of 
all LSIs, directly involving both the ECB and the 
European authority entrusted with EDIS, would 
be performed as part of the implementation of 
the EDIS legislation, as was the case for SIs in 
2014. The transition to the new deposit insurance 
regime should also include full implementation of 
a uniform regime for NPL provisioning covering 
both legacy and new NPLs.
4.1.2.3 Removing barriers to banking sector integration
Banking union requires geographically diversified 
banking groups within the euro area. This has to be 
a market-driven process, but public policies should 
not hinder it. For all SIs, the ability of national 
authorities to impose geographical ring-fencing 
of capital and/or liquidity within different entities 
inside the euro area should be entirely phased 
out. The prudential framework, including stress 
test scenarios, should also better acknowledge the 
financial stability benefits of banks’ geographical 
diversification within the euro area. 
Such cross-border integration should not, however, 
lead to an excessive size of the largest banking 
groups that would then benefit from a perceived 
‘too big to fail’ status. As a disincentive, the leverage 
ratio should be tightened for very large banking 
groups, as is the case in the United States and as 
recently agreed within the Basel Committee. 
4.1.3 Capital markets union
The European Commission’s promotion of a 
capital markets union agenda since 2014 has been 
useful to foster an analytical consensus on the 
need for both more capital markets development 
and more capital markets integration. But it has 
not yet led to major policy breakthroughs. It is 
now generally accepted that the capital markets 
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union and banking union are complementary 
projects and should together lead to a European 
financial sector that is less reliant on bank finance, 
more resilient, and more integrated across borders. 
At this juncture, sustainable and risk-absorbing 
cross-border capital flows, for example in the form 
of equity financing, are of particular significance.
The corresponding policy agenda is multifaceted, 
including reforms of insolvency law, taxation, 
accounting and auditing, housing financing, 
pension financing, financial infrastructure, 
investor protection, and more – all both important 
and difficult. 
The catalyst for progress should be a more 
independent and authoritative European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) as a hub for both 
policy development and consistent enforcement. 
This could ensure that the harmonisation of 
financial regulation would not be counteracted 
by diverse implementation. A stronger ESMA 
should gradually be granted wider authority over 
an increasing range of market segments, and 
vigorously promote a single rulebook which at this 
point remains more aspiration than reality. This is 
particularly important to avert the risk of market 
fragmentation because of Brexit, especially if the 
United Kingdom confirms its intention to leave 
the single market as well as the European Union. 
If some of the activity that is currently in London 
is redeployed to several rather than one financial 
centre, having a stronger enforcement hub at ESMA 
becomes much more important than in the recent 
past, when this function was practically delegated 
to the UK authorities. 
4.2 Fiscal architecture
In addition to the proposed reforms to the 
financial market architecture, improving the 
stability and growth prospects in the euro area 
also requires reforms to the fiscal architecture. 
Our reform proposals in this area fall in two 
categories. First, what might be called ‘discipline-
improving’ proposals. Fiscal rules should become 
simpler, less procyclical and easier to enforce, and 
sovereign debt restructuring should be feasible, 
but as a last resort. Both will reduce the risk of 
fiscal crises, and the latter should also reduce their 
depth and length. Second, we propose reforms 
that would enhance macroeconomic stability – our 
‘stabilisation-improving’ proposals. In addition 
to more stabilisation-friendly fiscal rules, these 
consist of two new fiscal stabilisation instruments 
at the level of the euro area, one of which would 
allow temporary – but not permanent – transfers 
to hard-hit countries. These instruments would be 
designed in a way that gives countries incentives 
to reform and/or adhere to the fiscal rules. We 
also suggest exploring the creation of a debt-based 
safe asset that would reduce contagion in case of 
sovereign debt crises.
4.2.1	 Reform	of	fiscal	rules
Fiscal rules, laid out in the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP), have been part of the euro area 
architecture since the inception of monetary 
union. Despite several reforms, they have 
not worked well. Excessive public debts have 
accumulated because of banking crises and the 
Great Recession, but also because either countries 
did not abide by European fiscal rules or the rules 
were not sufficiently stringent in good times. At 
the same time, the SGP has constrained fiscal 
stabilisation policy during the euro area crisis of 
2010-2013, overburdening the ECB as the main 
remaining instrument of macroeconomic policy in 
the euro area and contributing to low growth in 
many countries, which aggravated the public debt 
accumulation.
The poor functioning of the current fiscal rules 
is partly due to their design even after numerous 
reforms, and partly due to the way in which they 
are monitored and enforced. Deficit targets give 
rise to pro-cyclical fiscal policy – for example, 
higher expenditures in good times and lower 
expenditure in bad times – unless deficits are 
cyclically adjusted. But such adjustments are 
notoriously imprecise and difficult, even more so 
in the post-crisis environment than before. For this 
reason, recommendations to adjust fiscal policy by 
a given amount can turn out to be wrong ex post, 
and the fiscal indicator that is being targeted – the 
‘structural’ deficit – is hard to control and subject 
to major ex post revisions (Claeys et al., 2016; 
Coibion et al., 2017). Attempts to address these 
weaknesses by creating additional contingencies 
and exceptions have had the effect of making the 
rules increasingly complex, and hence difficult to 
implement and monitor.  
A further problem relates to enforcement, which 
is based on the threat of fines. These fines serve 
no economic purpose other than penalising a 
violation of the rules, and may further aggravate 
an already weak fiscal situation. As a result, large 
fines are not credible. To wit, no such fine has 
ever been imposed. For all these reasons – pro-
cyclicality, which hurts countries for which the 
rules bind; complexity, which makes them hard 
to explain and leads to micromanagement by the 
European Commission; and poor enforcement, 
which upsets countries that tend to comply – the 
rules have become a source of political friction.
At the same time, fiscal rules are necessary. Many 
countries outside the EU have national fiscal 
rules because they help commit government to 
not overspending. In a monetary union, there is 
an additional rationale for fiscal rules: excessive 
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debt accumulation can lead to messy default and 
potential exit from the currency union, triggering 
contagion and collateral damage for all members. 
One answer to this problem, as will be argued in 
the next section, is to create structures that limit 
the economic costs of debt restructuring inside the 
currency union both to the crisis country and to 
other members. Another answer is to put in place 
better fiscal rules. Because either of these solutions 
is bound to be imperfect, one should aim at both.
4.2.1.1 Expenditure rules with a debt target
Fiscal rules should (1) be as transparent and 
simple as possible; (2) set targets in terms of 
fiscal indicators under the direct control of the 
government; (3) allow countercyclical fiscal policy 
to stabilise macroeconomic shocks; (4) generate 
incentives to reduce excessive public debt; and (5) 
embed an escape clause in case of very large shocks. 
In the European context, monitoring should occur 
to a significant extent at the national level – by 
an independent national fiscal council – under the 
oversight of a euro area fiscal watchdog (see the 
final section of this blueprint for details). Finally, 
enforcement cannot rely solely on the threat of 
penalties that are unlikely to be credible.
Recent research shows that rules on nominal 
public expenditure growth ceilings consistent with 
a public debt reduction target are better suited to 
meet these conditions than a system relying on 
a superposition of debt targets, nominal deficit 
targets, and cyclically adjusted deficit targets, such 
as the present one.14  
The basic principle underlying an expenditure 
rule of this type is easy to describe: nominal 
expenditures should not grow faster than long-
term nominal income (that is, the sum of potential 
output growth and expected inflation), and they 
should grow at a slower pace in countries that 
need to pay down their debts. Unlike the cyclically 
adjusted deficit, expenditure is observable in 
real time. Furthermore, expenditure rules embed 
countercyclical stabilisation both because cyclical 
revenue increases have no effect on the expenditure 
ceiling – inducing stronger fiscal discipline in good 
times compared to the current rules – and because 
they do not require cyclical revenue shortfalls to 
be offset by lower expenditure.
This suggests a two-pillar approach, consisting 
of (1) a long-term target debt level, such as 60% 
of GDP, or a more bespoke objective taking into 
account, for example, implicit liabilities arising 
from pay-as-you-go pension systems; and (2) an 
expenditure-based operational rule to achieve the 
anchor. In practice, this could work as follows:
14  See, in particular, Andrle et al. (2015), Claeys et al. (2016), 
Ayuso-i-Casals (2012) and Holm-Hadulla et al. (2012).
1. Each year, an independent, national-level 
fiscal council proposes a rolling medium-term 
(e. g. five-year-ahead) debt reduction target 
for approval to the euro area fiscal watchdog. 
The target would depend on (1) the distance 
between the actual debt-to-GDP ratio and 
the long-term target of 60% (the bigger the 
distance, the more ambitious the adjustment); 
and (2) a broader analysis of fiscal sustainability 
(in particular, to give credit to countries that 
undertake solvency-improving entitlement 
reforms, or major reforms expected to raise 
potential growth). As a result, the medium-term 
debt reduction pace should not be determined 
by a formula. However, discretion could be 
constrained, for example, by requiring that the 
medium-term debt ratio target never exceeds 
the current debt ratio until the long-term target 
has been reached. 
2. In parallel, the national fiscal council would 
prepare a medium-term nominal growth 
projection based on expected potential output 
growth; expected inflation, consistent with the 
ECB’s price stability objective; and a possible 
cyclical correction, in case initial conditions 
depart markedly from long-run equilibrium.
3. After the medium-term target and the nominal 
growth projection have been approved, the 
national fiscal council charts a consistent 
medium-term nominal expenditure path and 
uses it to set a nominal expenditure ceiling for 
the coming year, for use in the preparation of 
the corresponding budget. 
4. Nominal expenditures are calculated net of 
interest payments, of unemployment spending 
(except when these are due to discretionary 
changes to unemployment benefits), and of 
the estimated impact of any new discretionary 
revenue measures (changes in tax rates and tax 
bases). The first two adjustments allow for more 
counter-cyclicality, while excluding the effect 
of expenditure-increasing structural measures. 
The last adjustment is meant to preclude the 
manipulation of tax rules (for example, tax cuts 
ahead of an election) that are not compensated 
by offsetting expenditure measures. They also 
allow elected governments to make fiscal policy 
choices (implying different long-term levels of 
expenditures and taxes) that reflect political 
preferences and social compacts. 
5. If a country passes a budget with spending 
above the target, all excessive spending must 
be financed by junior sovereign bonds.15 These 
would (1) be legally subordinated (i.e. first to 
15 Requiring countries to finance budget deficits with junior 
sovereign bonds was first suggested by Fuest et al. (2015) 
under the heading of ‘Accountability Bonds’; see also Fuest 
and Heinemann (2017).
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be restructured in case a debt reduction is 
deemed necessary to ensure sustainability); (2) 
contain a so-called one-limb collective action 
clause (see next section); (3) be issued with 
fixed maturity (e.g. five years, albeit with an 
early-repayment option, see below), (4) contain 
a clause that specifies an automatic three-year 
maturity extension if the country receives a 
standard ESM-supported conditional assistance 
programme; and (5) not benefit from existing 
regulatory privileges of ‘normal’ sovereign debt 
(e.g. zero risk-weighting) and in addition be 
subject to enhanced large exposure limits (e.g. 
5%), substantially below the Basel framework’s 
cap at 25% of tier-one capital. Junior sovereign 
bonds would also be included in the calculation 
of sovereign concentration charges. Because 
the market for such junior bonds will likely be 
small, their yields may also reflect a liquidity 
premium. For all these reasons, the price of 
junior sovereign bonds should be significantly 
lower than those of regular sovereign bonds.
6. Limited deviations between actual and 
budgeted spending could be absorbed by an 
‘adjustment account’ that would be credited if 
expenditures net of discretionary tax cuts run 
below the expenditure rule, and debited if they 
exceed it.16 If a country passes a budget with 
no excessive spending but realised spending is 
above the target, the overrun could be financed 
without issuing junior bonds, provided that 
the deficit in the adjustment account does not 
exceed a pre-determined threshold (say, 1% of 
GDP). Once this threshold has been breached, 
all excessive new expenditures would need to 
be financed by junior sovereign bonds in the 
following year.
7. Once the government returns to compliance 
with the rule, it would be allowed to buy back 
the junior bonds, or repay them early, up to some 
annual ceiling. This ceiling would be calibrated 
to ensure that the junior sovereign debt stock 
of countries that have violated the expenditure 
rule repeatedly (or to a greater extent) would 
take several years to eliminate, while one-time 
(or minor) violations could be eliminated as 
soon as countries return to compliance. 
8. An escape clause would allow countries to 
deviate from the rule in case of ‘exceptional 
circumstances’. The activation of such a clause 
would have to be agreed by the Eurogroup, after 
consultation with the euro area fiscal watchdog.
9. Compliance would rely not just on implicit 
penalties (the need to issue junior sovereign 
bonds), but also on ‘carrots’. This could include 
preferred access to ESM loans (see the next 
section).
16 Such accounts exist in the German and Swiss fiscal rules.
This system would exhibit better stabilisation 
properties than the current one. It would not make 
room for additional spending when tax revenues 
are temporarily buoyant. Nor would it require 
cutting spending in bad times, even if there is a 
temporary revenue shortfall over and above what 
mechanically results from the output decline. It 
would also be easier to control and less dependent 
on unobservable variables than the current system 
based on structural deficits.  
Apart from these better stabilisation properties, 
the key advantage of this system compared to the 
current one is the enforcement mechanism. 
• At present, imposing a sanction on a country 
that violates the SGP requires political will 
both on the side of the European Commission 
and of the European Council. This creates a 
time consistency problem: ex ante (before 
a violation), everyone agrees that credible 
sanctions are important to enforce the SGP, 
but once the SGP is violated, imposing that 
sanction may do more political and economic 
harm than good. In contrast, the circumstances 
that require a country to issue junior sovereign 
bonds will have been laid out in advance. With 
the junior sovereign bond rule, no action is 
required except by the country itself, which is 
asked to respect a specific contractual format. 
Even that could be dispensed with, since the 
conditions under which the bonds are issued 
(i.e. in compliance with the expenditure rule or 
not) are observable, banks and the ESM would 
be required to treat these bonds accordingly 
(i.e. hold capital, or require a reprofiling), and 
the ECB would require a higher haircut for its 
refinancing operations.
• Unlike sanctions, requiring countries that 
violate the fiscal rule to issue junior bonds 
has a clear economic rationale: it protects the 
existing bondholders, by creating a buffer of 
junior sovereign debt that will be restructured 
first. This is akin to debt covenants protecting 
the interests of creditors in privately issued 
debt, and could in fact lower the average cost of 
debt issuance (Borensztein et al., 2004 , Section 
IV).
• The cost at which junior sovereign bonds are 
issued will depend on the reasons why they were 
issued and market expectations about the future 
fiscal path. If a government has a compelling 
argument for exceeding its expenditure ceiling 
– for example, an investment and reform push 
that is likely to raise future growth and hence 
reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio in the medium 
term – the market may not require a significant 
risk premium. Furthermore, the faster markets 
expect the country to return to compliance 
with the fiscal rule, the smaller the penalty, 
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because the government will generally have an 
incentive to repay their junior bonds early once 
they can do so. This is a further reason why this 
system creates good incentives.  
No system is perfect, and the proposed system is no 
exception. One drawback is that the cost of issuing 
junior sovereign bonds may depend not only on 
the motives and credibility of the government, 
but also on market conditions largely outside the 
control of the government. Market discipline may 
be (too) low when monetary conditions are easy 
and/or risk spreads are compressed, and (too) high 
when monetary conditions are tight and/or risk 
appetite vanishes. Yet, unlike the current system, 
this is unlikely to induce pro-cyclical behaviour, 
since monetary conditions tend to be easier in 
bad times. Another potential drawback is that the 
system might create incentives to ‘cheat’ through 
the tax administration system (under-collecting 
revenues in lieu of cutting taxes). To prevent this 
from happening, the national fiscal council needs 
to be empowered to monitor such cheating and 
adjust the expenditure ceiling accordingly. 
More generally, successful monitoring and 
enforcement of the new system will rely on the 
quality and power of national fiscal councils 
and their cooperation with the euro area fiscal 
watchdog. However, because the system itself 
is easier to justify, it produces fewer situations 
that run counter to the national interest (such as 
cutting expenditures in a recession) and relies on a 
time-consistent enforcement mechanism. Thus, it 
should stand a much greater chance of success than 
the current one. This also implies that the share 
of junior bonds should remain a small fraction of 
total sovereign debt.
To ensure proper enforcement, the obligation to 
finance spending overruns with junior sovereign 
bonds should become part of the national 
legislations governing the budget process. 
Failure to comply should be subject to judicial 
enforcement and contestable both before national 
constitutional courts and the European Court of 
Justice. 
4.2.2 Strengthening the institutional and legal 
underpinnings of sovereign debt restructuring 
The second element of the fiscal architecture 
reforms proposed in this blueprint is a more credible 
enforcement of the no bailout rule – understood to 
mean that insolvent countries should not receive 
financial assistance from other countries unless 
they first restructure their debts. This is important 
for two reasons: 
• It will provide stronger incentives for 
responsible fiscal policies, complementing the 
reform of fiscal rules proposed at the beginning 
of this section. Importantly, this argument does 
not rely on the assumption that markets price 
sovereign risk correctly or that policymakers 
dutifully adjust in response to changes in risk 
premia. Rather, the essential condition is that 
insolvent countries lose access to finance faster 
if the no bailout rule is credible than if it is 
not. Furthermore, implicit guarantees can fuel 
booms in capital flows and credit, which in 
turn increase crisis risks and lower both market 
discipline and policy discipline.17 The financial 
and fiscal architectures of the euro area should 
hence avoid such implicit guarantees.
• It will prevent economically destructive 
‘gambles for redemption’, in which insolvent 
countries delay restructuring through ESM- or 
IMF-supported attempts at fiscal adjustment 
that ultimately prove fruitless. As the case of 
Greece shows, such gambles can not only put 
an economy into a tailspin, but produce long-
lasting social and political scars. 
The most important condition for the credibility 
of the no bailout rule is to reduce the economic 
and financial disruptions that result from a debt 
restructuring, since it is the fear of these disruptions 
that pushes countries into gambles for redemption. 
Several of the proposals suggested above – most 
importantly, reducing the direct exposures of banks 
to their domestic sovereign and fostering private-
sector risk sharing through banking and capital 
markets union – will contribute to this objective, 
and so would two of the proposals discussed in the 
sections that follow (an incentive-friendly fiscal 
capacity that supports countries in the face of a 
large rise in unemployment, and a euro area-level 
safe asset). 
While mitigating the economic and financial 
disruptions of debt restructuring is a necessary 
condition for the credibility of the no bailout 
rule, it is not sufficient, for two reasons. First, 
the effectiveness and potential costs of debt 
restructuring depend not only on their economic 
impact but also on the legal framework. Second, 
even with the right economic and legal framework, 
debt restructurings may look unattractive to 
policymakers if official lending continues to be 
available as an alternative. Top policymakers 
often lose their jobs in a fiscal crisis leading to 
default (Borensztein and Panizza, 2009; Livshits 
et al., 2014), and debt restructurings can have 
reputational consequences that are, or appear to 
be, costly even with better risk sharing and a less-
exposed financial sector. As a result, the proposals 
made so far need to be accompanied by legal 
reforms and more credible ESM lending policies.
17  See Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) and Weder di Mauro 
and Zettelmeyer (2017) for a discussion and additional 
references.
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4.2.2.1 Better protections against ‘hold-out creditors’
The most important legal risk in a debt 
restructuring comes from the fact that ‘hold-outs’ 
may refuse to take part in the restructuring.  The 
sovereign is then faced with a difficult choice. It 
can refuse to pay the holdouts, which may lead 
to protracted legal battles and restrict its ability to 
issue debt internationally, or it can repay them, 
which reduces debt relief and may be viewed as 
unfair burden sharing. The option of ‘holding out’ 
also gives some creditors additional bargaining 
power, which can make it tougher to achieve a deal 
restoring debt sustainability. 
In recognition of the hold-out problem, the ESM 
treaty commits euro area countries to include 
a standardised collective action clause (the 
‘Euro-CAC’) permitting a restructuring of the 
payment terms of the bond with the agreement 
of a qualified majority of creditors (Gelpern and 
Gulati, 2013). While Euro-CACs have not been 
tested, the experience with very similar (English 
law) CACs in the 2012 Greek restructuring has not 
been encouraging: out of 35 English law bonds 
only 17 were restructured, because the required 
supermajorities can easily be blocked by specialised 
investors buying a large share of a specific bond 
at very low prices. The holders of the remaining 
18 bonds have since been repaid in full – setting a 
precedent that hold-out strategies can work in the 
euro area (Zettelmeyer et al., 2013).
Legal reforms to deal with holdouts can take several 
forms. Some authors have argued for a full-fledged, 
treaty-based sovereign bankruptcy court (Gianviti 
et al., 2010; Paulus and Tirado, 2013). However, the 
hold-out problem could also be resolved without 
any new institutions. One approach would be to 
change collective action clauses to allow bonds 
to be restructured with the consent of a qualified 
majority of all bondholders (i.e. without requiring 
bond-by-bond supermajorities; this is sometimes 
referred to as ‘single-limb aggregation’). CACs of 
this type have been endorsed by the IMF and the 
International Capital Markets Association and 
adopted by many countries, but not in the euro 
area (Gelpern, 2014; IMF, 2014, 2017). Another 
approach would be to change the ESM treaty in 
a way that would extend immunity from judicial 
process to sovereigns whose debt restructuring 
has been negotiated in the context of an ESM 
programme and/or agreed by a (super)majority of 
creditors (Buchheit et al., 2013a, 2013b; Fuest et al., 
2014). These approaches could be complementary, 
since the first approach would apply only to new 
bonds, while the second would also apply to the 
existing stock.18
4.2.2.2 An ESM policy preventing lending to insolvent 
countries unless accompanied by debt 
restructuring
In theory, the ESM is committed not to lend to 
countries with debt-servicing problems unless the 
combination of ESM lending and conditionality is 
either very likely to restore debt sustainability or is 
accompanied by a debt restructuring. Two elements 
of the present ESM treaty attempt to provide such 
a commitment. First, as a precondition for crisis 
lending, the ESM treaty requires the European 
Commission to assess whether public debt is 
sustainable, “wherever appropriate and possible 
… together with the IMF.” Furthermore, the treaty 
preamble states that “a euro area Member State 
requesting financial assistance from the ESM is 
expected to address, wherever possible, a similar 
request to the IMF”.  
Hence, the present treaty effectively assigns the 
IMF the role of a commitment device. However, 
this device has by now failed twice: in 2010, when 
the IMF changed its lending policy to allow itself to 
co-lend with European crisis lenders despite doubts 
about Greek debt sustainability; and in June 2015, 
when the ESM approved a new programme with 
Greece without IMF participation, despite IMF and 
European Commission warnings that the Greek 
debt may not be sustainable. The euro area should 
not subcontract substantial parts of its conditional 
assistance policy to the IMF anymore. Co-lending 
with the IMF may be desirable, but it should not be 
regarded as indispensable.   
The ESM should hence develop its own criteria for 
deciding when there is a significant risk that an 
assistance programme might not restore solvency 
to a crisis-struck country. When this is the case, it 
should insist on a private debt restructuring – at 
least in the form of a maturity extension –  as a 
condition for financial support. The criteria used 
to make this decision must be transparent and 
consistent across countries. One option could be 
to follow the example of the new IMF exceptional 
access policy (introduced in 2016) and require a 
maturity extension of privately held debts for the 
duration of an ESM-financed programme whenever 
debt sustainability is uncertain (IMF, 2015, 2016; 
18 For bonds issued under local law, there is also the option 
of using the local legislature to implement a class-voting 
mechanism across the entire stock of locally issued sovereign 
bonds, which was used in the 2012 Greek restructuring. 
However, substantial stocks of euro area government debt 
are governed by foreign law. Furthermore, the fact that local 
law bonds issued after 2012 carry CACs makes it more likely 
that restructurings based on acts of the local legislature will 
be subject to legal challenge. Finally, enacting class voting 
ad hoc is clearly less desirable, in terms of creating stable 
expectations, than writing such a mechanism into law or 
contract.
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Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer, 2017). Whether 
this is the case would need to be assessed based on 
a data-driven method that can be reproduced and 
checked by the public. Should the programme fail 
to restore solvency, a deeper restructuring would 
have to follow as a condition for further support.
When introducing such a policy, it is essential to 
ensure that it does not give rise to the expectation 
that some of the present debts of high-debt 
countries will inevitably be restructured, triggering 
financial instability in debt markets. To address 
this ‘transition problem’, some proposals suggest 
committing to the policy immediately (for example, 
in the context of a change in the ESM treaty) while 
delaying implementation until a specific date.19 
However, this approach is problematic because it 
can create incentives to exploit the weaknesses of 
the previous policy before the new one becomes 
effective, and it is unlikely to be time consistent as 
there will be a temptation to extend the deadline 
as it draws closer. 
While there is, in fact, no completely clean solution 
to the transition problem, it can and must be 
mitigated in several ways. First, there can be ways 
of phasing in new policies gradually, in a way that 
does not lead to the perverse incentives and reduces 
the time consistency problem just described. For 
example, the new lending policy could apply only 
after newly issued debt has reached a minimum 
volume (e.g. 60% of GDP) (Andritzky et al., 2016; 
Corsetti et al., 2016). Second, the new policy 
should be introduced at a time when the debts 
of all euro area countries that depend on market 
access – particularly those of high-debt countries 
– are widely expected to be sustainable with high 
probability,20 assuming policies stay on track.21 
Third, the new policy should be announced in 
combination with other reforms – such as the risk-
sharing mechanisms proposed in this blueprint – 
that help to prevent and mitigate deep debt crises, 
and hence reduce sovereign risk. The chances of a 
negative market reaction to reforms as a package 
should be low.
4.2.3	 Creating	incentive-friendly	fiscal	stabilisation	tools	
The euro area currently possesses only one tool 
that can potentially provide fiscal support to 
countries in downturns and crises, namely, the 
ESM. However, the ESM’s function is defined very 
narrowly. It is meant to help countries only when 
they have lost market access or are in danger or 
doing so, when this “is indispensable to safeguard 
the financial stability of the euro area as a whole 
19 See Weder di Mauro and Zettelmeyer (2017) for a survey.
20 Blanchard and Zettelmeyer (2017) argue that this is true for 
Italy today.
21 The initial Franco-German commitment (at Deauville 
in 2010) to “involve the private sector” in the rescue 
of insolvent countries backfired in part because it was 
announced in the middle of a crisis.
and of its Member States”, and when the debt of 
the country is sustainable. This ‘ultima ratio’ logic 
creates two problems: 
• First – and partly because of the lack of alternative 
instruments – there may be pressure to use the 
ESM inappropriately to lend to countries with 
doubtful debt sustainability. 
• Second, there are situations in which risk 
sharing across countries may be fruitful but that 
do not meet the conditions for ESM support. 
Addressing the first problem requires a viable 
debt-restructuring regime as described in the 
preceding section. In what follows, we present 
two tools that could address the second problem 
without creating permanent transfers or distorting 
incentives.  Indeed, both facilities presented below 
are intended to create incentives for growth- and 
stability-improving reforms, because they could 
only be accessed by countries that undertake such 
reforms and do not slide back over time. 
4.2.3.1 A European fiscal capacity for large economic 
shocks
Consider a large economic downturn that affects 
one country more than other euro area countries. 
In such a case, national governments may find 
it difficult to stabilise their economies because 
monetary policy will not react (or not react enough). 
Countries should, of course, use national fiscal 
instruments – particularly if the reform of fiscal 
rules proposed in the previous section is adopted. 
Depending on the nature of the downturn, they 
may or may not have access to the ESM. But both 
options are based on borrowing only, which, in 
the absence of an independent monetary policy, 
may not be enough to deal with large shocks. A 
mechanism that would provide temporary relief in 
case a country is hit by a significant disturbance 
would help strengthen the economic value of, and 
the political support for, continued membership of 
all current members in the euro.22   
We hence propose a fiscal stabilisation scheme 
that would offer one-off transfers in case of large 
downturns affecting one or several member states. 
It would be designed as a reinsurance fund for 
large shocks affecting the labour market in euro 
area countries, and could be conceived as a line 
in the EU budget, or as a subsidiary of the ESM. 
‘Reinsurance’ means that covering the ‘first loss’ 
associated with a particular shock remains the 
responsibility of the country itself. The fund 
would therefore be activated only if the shock 
exceeds a specified level, and cover only a portion 
of the losses above that level. In insurance terms, 
22 See Farhi and Werning (2017), who show that mechanisms 
of this type can substantially improve a currency union's 
ability to deal with large asymmetric shocks.
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this is akin to ‘catastrophic loss’ insurance with 
a large deductible. This approach makes sense 
for two reasons: first, the welfare gains from 
insurance against small shocks are small, and grow 
disproportionately with the size of the shock; 
second, countries would continue to have strong 
incentives to prevent a downturn (Beblavý et al., 
2015).
More specifically, the arrangement would set 
conditions for participation, a trigger for the 
activation of transfers and a rule determining 
the size of transfers, conditionality on the use 
of transferred funds, and a rule determining 
contributions, as follows:
1. Conditionality ex ante. To participate in the 
scheme, member states would need to meet 
relevant minimum standards, including 
compliance with the fiscal rules and country-
specific recommendations of the European 
semester. 
2. Trigger. While real GDP carries the advantage of 
being simple and hard to manipulate, it is revised 
several times after the first estimate, observable 
only with a significant lag, and is sometimes 
affected by accounting. We therefore propose 
to base the fiscal stabilisation instrument on 
employment-based indicators: changes in the 
unemployment rate, employment, or the wage 
bill, using a common definition.23 For example, 
if in year t a member state experiences a year-
on-year increase in its unemployment rate or 
decline in employment which exceeds a certain 
threshold (for example, 2 percentage points), it 
would receive a one-off transfer to be paid out 
in years t+1 and t+2.24 
3. Payouts. There would be a one-time transfer of 
a fixed percentage of national GDP for each 
percentage point increase in unemployment 
or decline in employment or in the wage bill 
beyond the specified threshold. For example, 
a 3 percentage-point increase in the annual 
unemployment rate – one percentage point 
above the trigger level – would trigger a 
0.25% of GDP transfer, while a 4 percentage-
point increase would trigger a 0.5% of GDP 
transfer. If unemployment stays at that level 
in the following year, or continues to rise but 
below the threshold of 2%, there would be no 
23 Using declines in employment (defined in terms of hours) 
or the (market) wage bill as the trigger variable has the 
advantage that it would not create incentives against labour 
market policies such as subsidised ‘short work’ (Kurzarbeit), 
which lower the rate of unemployment at a fiscal cost.
24 The inevitable delay in making payments may not be a 
big problem, for the following reason: if a shock occurs, 
countries can usually react by letting automatic stabilisers 
work – it is one or two years after when budget constraints 
may bite and force countries to consolidate too early. 
In addition, the prospect that transfers will come will 
immediately improve the ability to borrow.
additional transfer. The fund makes payouts up 
to its depletion (to protect the fund from early 
depletion, annual payouts could be capped at a 
maximum percent of recipient country GDP). 
There is no borrowing. If several countries are 
entitled to a transfer summing up to more than 
the accumulated funds, the transfers would be 
reduced proportionally.25 
4. Conditionality ex post. There would be conditions 
ensuring that the transfer is used to finance 
relevant spending – such as active or passive 
policies related to unemployment, or public 
investment – and raises total spending.26 One 
option would be to transfer payments directly 
to a pre-assigned group of beneficiaries, such as 
the short-term unemployed or underemployed. 
National fiscal boards would monitor the 
conditions. If fiscal rules are reformed along 
the lines suggested in the previous section, 
spending associated with the transfer would 
not be included in the nominal expenditure 
that is constrained by the rule.27 
5. Contributions. The system would be financed 
through contributions based on GDP (or 
alternatively, on GNI). The level of national 
contributions should depend on the volatility 
of the variable that is used to define the trigger, 
based on a rolling time window, since this 
determines the probability that the country 
will in fact receive a payout.  The higher that 
probability, the higher the contribution. The 
volume of total annual contributions could be 
in the order of 0.1% of GDP of the participating 
countries. Contributions would be made every 
year, even during crises.28
To give one example, starting in a period with 
low unemployment, with zero interest rates, 
the fund would have accumulated 0.5% of the 
GDP of participating countries after five years. If 
25 An important question is whether the lack of a borrowing 
capacity would be credible, assuming a severe crisis in 
which the fund runs out of money. We think that the 
answer is yes, because in a setting in which the fund has 
run out of money, it would not be possible to establish 
creditworthiness without a prior borrowing track record 
unless the members give explicit guarantees, which is 
politically implausible. The more likely outcome will be an 
ad hoc arrangement to either raise contributions from the 
fund or to have the fund borrow from its members rather 
than from the market (for example, this is how the IMF’s 
resources were temporarily increased in 2009 to avoid it 
being financially constrained during the crisis).
26 Conditionality of this type is always imperfect because it 
is impossible to know what the counterfactual would have 
been without the transfer, hence the ‘additionality’ of the 
required spending increases. However, it can be designed to 
ensure a minimum fiscal stimulus over time.
27 Under current, deficit-based fiscal rules, there is no need 
for any adjustment since the transfer would not raise the 
deficit.
28 While countries experiencing large shocks could be granted 
a reduced or even a zero contribution, the same effect can 
be achieved by increasing the payout rate.
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countries representing a half of participants’ GDP 
were to subsequently suffer a 4 percentage point 
increase in their unemployment rates, transfers 
net of continuing contributions would amount to 
0.5% of GDP for the affected countries, i.e. 0.25% 
of participants’ GDP, depleting 50% of the fund. 
Of course, different trigger values, transfer and 
contribution rates are possible, as long as they 
follow similar principles as outlined in the example 
given.
Three characteristics of our proposal would help 
maintain good incentives. First, the ‘first loss’ is 
borne at the national level.  Second, participation 
in the scheme depends on the quality of policies, 
including the possibility of exclusion if policies 
deteriorate significantly and persistently. Third, 
contribution levels would depend on the 
probability of drawing, updated each year to reflect 
the evolving experience (in this sense, the proposed 
system would embed an ‘experience rating’ along 
the lines of insurance arrangements, in which 
premia rise after the insured draws). This ensures 
that the scheme cannot give rise to permanent 
transfers. The latter is important not just to avoid 
moral hazard (i.e. countries setting policies to 
capture such a transfer) but also to maintain the 
stability of the arrangement. If countries were to 
find that their contributions significantly exceed 
their drawings even after a long time, they might 
ask themselves whether it is worth staying in the 
system.  
One issue that would need to be addressed is 
how the fund should be invested. One the one 
hand, the fund should earn a return; on the 
other, liquidity is important to enable payouts in 
reaction to unforeseen events. Possible investment 
strategies range from low-risk, high-liquidity 
strategies (investment in liquid money market 
assets) to a more long-term strategy taking higher 
risks (a euro area sovereign wealth fund) so long 
as the liquidity of the fund is assured. The latter 
could happen either by maintaining an adequate 
cash buffer or by allowing collateralised short-term 
liquidity support from the ECB.
4.2.3.2 Broadening access conditions to the ESM for 
countries with good policies
The proposed fiscal capacity has two important 
limitations: it can be accessed only in the case of 
very large shocks, and it has no borrowing capacity, 
meaning that it can run out if unemployment 
rises in many countries at the same time and/or 
there are successive increases in unemployment. 
These limitations are motivated by concerns about 
incentives and a wish to refrain from creating a 
capacity to borrow that is neither backed by a tax 
resource nor under the control of a legislative body. 
But they leave a gap that country-level stabilisation 
policies may not be able to fill, including because 
member countries may have incentives to engage 
in fiscal contraction in a downturn for fear of 
losing market access, or because market conditions 
deteriorate due to contagion from another country. 
One way of addressing this gap would be to broaden 
the access criteria to low-cost ESM lending for pre-
qualified countries – that is, to allow conditional 
lending from the ESM even when countries have 
not lost market access and when there is no 
imminent financial stability risk to the euro area 
as a whole, as the current conditions require. Such 
lending would have a fiscal impact because it 
would typically happen at significantly lower rates 
than borrowing from the market (reflecting the 
lower funding costs of the ESM). Unlike standard 
lending from the ESM, ESM borrowing through 
this window, by pre-qualified countries, would 
not trigger the automatic re-profiling of the junior 
sovereign bonds described in the previous section.
Another benefit of such a capacity would be to 
deter countries from self-insuring through the 
accumulation of cash reserves. It is well known in 
international finance that self-insurance is costly 
and that collective insurance is preferable. The 
same applies within the euro area: a country that 
hoards cash instead of paying down its debt incurs 
an efficiency cost.     
Conceptually, a ‘flexible’ ESM facility of this sort 
would follow the same structure as the fiscal 
capacity just described, except that there are no 
contributions (only repayments of loans). However, 
the various elements would be defined somewhat 
differently compared to both the fiscal capacity 
and to standard ESM programmes, as follows:
1. Conditionality ex ante. Unlike standard ESM 
borrowing, only countries with strong policy 
records and full compliance with the fiscal rule 
would be allowed to access the facility.
2. Trigger. The economic ‘shock’ allowing access 
to the facility would be less stringently defined 
than both the current conditions for ESM 
access (a financial crisis threatening the entire 
euro area) and the trigger for the fiscal capacity. 
With strong ex ante conditionality, one could 
even consider not requiring a quantitative 
trigger at all – instead, countries may simply 
be asked to make an argument for why they 
need the capacity. Access would be given based 
on the strength of that argument compared to 
the costs of granting the request, which is the 
commitment of ESM funds.
3. Payouts. Low-interest lending over a specified 
time period (e.g. three years), repayable over a 
longer period. However, this period should be 
kept commensurate with cyclical developments. 
At any rate, it should be much shorter than 
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current maximum weighted average maturity 
period of the ESM of 32.5 years, to maintain 
the ESM’s capacity to lend in the face of 
potentially greater use. Furthermore, the total 
lending capacity of this window of the ESM 
should remain limited, so that drawings on it 
(which might typically occur in the early phase 
of a recession) would not deplete the resources 
available for conditional lending.
4. Conditionality ex post. Given conditionality ex 
ante, and the fact that countries supported under 
the facility would be in much less dire situations 
than those of countries that have accessed the 
ESM and EFSF in the past, this could be much 
lighter than in current ESM programmes. 
However, it would be more stringent than for 
the fiscal capacity, in the sense that it does not 
merely seek to regulate the use of funds. Rather, 
its purpose would also be to ensure continued 
good economic policies in a broader sense, and 
hence the country’s capacity to repay the ESM.
4.2.4 A euro area safe asset
In recent years, there have been several proposals 
for the creation of a euro area safe asset backed by 
sovereign bonds. While early proposals envisaged 
some form of mutual guarantee that would ensure 
the safety of these assets – but could also lead to 
redistribution and moral hazard – more recent 
proposals dispense with this feature. Instead, 
‘safety’ is achieved by some combination of 
diversification and seniority. In the best-known and 
most developed proposal, financial intermediaries 
would purchase a standardised diversified portfolio 
of sovereign bonds (not including any junior 
sovereign bonds, as those proposed in the section 
on fiscal rules) and use this as collateral for a security 
issued in several tranches.29 The ‘subordination 
level’ (that is, the size of the junior and mezzanine 
tranches) could be calibrated so that the five-year 
expected loss of the most senior tranche – referred 
to as European Senior Bonds, or ESBies – is about 
the same as that of a AAA-rated sovereign bond. 
Because assets of this type should both be 
attractive to banks seeking to reduce concentrated 
sovereign exposures and create demand for the 
bonds of these sovereigns, they should ideally 
be introduced in parallel with a regulation on 
limiting sovereign concentration risk in a way 
that would avoid disruptive shifts in the demand 
for euro area sovereign bonds. In other words, 
safe assets could help to ensure financial stability 
during a transition period in which banks reduce 
large exposures to specific sovereigns (see above 
29 See Brunnermeier et al. (2011, 2017) and Corsetti et al. 
(2015, 2016). This proposal has undergone extensive study 
by a task force appointed by the European Systemic Risk 
Board, which is expected to issue its report shortly. For a 
comparison between the Brunnermeier et al. proposals and 
other proposals, see Leandro and Zettelmeyer (2017).
on financial sector architecture).  At the same 
time, they could also increase the stability of both 
potential crisis countries and the euro area after 
the transition period – that is, in the steady state – 
for two reasons.   
First, they would offer a higher level of protection 
for the banks that hold them than a diversified 
portfolio of sovereign bonds, because their holder 
would benefit not only from diversification but 
also from seniority (depending on the proposal, 
either of the claim that they are holding or of 
the intermediary issuing this claim). This would 
significantly reduce the risk that a crisis in one 
country could lead to contagion to other countries 
through the bonds that banks hold as part of a 
diversified portfolio.
Second, they would reduce the impact of shifts 
in market sentiment against vulnerable euro area 
members, helping them to maintain market access 
and avoid sharp spikes in borrowing costs. Although 
this report advocates more market discipline in 
response to deteriorating fundamentals, changes 
in borrowing conditions that are triggered or 
magnified by changes in investor risk appetite 
are a threat to financial stability.  A European 
safe asset could reduce such undesirable volatility 
by dampening the mechanism through which 
it operates: the sharp reduction in the desired 
exposures of investors to riskier countries. This 
can magnify the impact of financial and economic 
shocks on borrowing costs – and potentially 
trigger loss of market access – beyond what would 
be justified by deteriorating fundamentals. A 
European safe asset would dampen this effect by 
introducing a class of investors (the intermediaries 
issuing safe assets) that would purchase sovereign 
bonds based on a fixed set of portfolio weights. 
Hence, creating a safe asset in the euro area would 
create a source of demand for euro area sovereign 
debt that is not ‘skittish’ in the face of changes in 
market sentiment.30
Like any major financial innovation, introducing a 
European safe asset such as ESBies would carry the 
risk of unintended consequences. One risk is that 
any asset that is introduced with the aim of ‘safety’ 
might be viewed as carrying an implicit guarantee 
by the European official sector, even if it does not 
carry any explicit guarantee. Another risk is that 
it may be difficult to find buyers for the junior 
tranches in times of crisis. There may be further 
risks related to the regulatory environment of the 
new assets and the intermediaries that issue them. 
These risks must be mitigated by appropriate 
design and experimentation. The risk of implicit 
30 At least so long as sovereigns do not lose market access 
(see below), since this may trigger their exclusion from 
the collateral pool of new issues. Until that time, however, 
portfolio weights would be fixed.
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guarantees can be reduced by relying on many 
private issuers rather than a single public issuer. At 
the same time, the activities of these private issuers 
must be regulated to avoid new counterparty 
risks. Private issuers must remain pure risk pass-
through vehicles that buy and issue according to 
a prescribed protocol. To ensure that the junior 
tranches retain market access, bonds of countries 
that lose market access should no longer be eligible 
for purchase by safe asset issuers, and regulation 
must ensure that these issuers are treated no worse 
than any other investors by the debtor countries. 
Regulation should dissuade, or tightly limit, bank 
holdings of the junior (or mezzanine) tranches. 
Finally, a phase of evaluation and experimentation 
(i.e. an issuance in small amounts) should 
precede any ‘scaling up’ of issuance.  And as 
discussed previously, a prerequisite for the latter 
is the regulation of banks’ concentrated sovereign 
exposures, which would create a strong incentive 
to hold safe assets such as ESBies in the first place. 
4.3 Institutional architecture
Institutions matter because governance cannot 
rely on rules alone. A functional governance must 
rest on legitimate and accountable institutions 
endowed with a defined mandate and equipped 
with the means necessary to fulfil their mandate. 
The euro area, however, suffers from an institutional 
imbalance. Whereas in the area of monetary policy 
a clear governance approach was developed, fiscal 
and macroeconomic governance suffers from 
considerable complexity and a lack of clarity in the 
match between institutions and functions. This 
is in part inevitable – there is a single monetary 
policy, but not a single economic or fiscal policy. 
However, the present level of confusion exceeds 
the inevitable.  
In monetary policy, beyond the well-known 
features of institutional independence and a clear 
mandate, there is a dual structure combining 
national actors (national central banks) and 
European actors (ECB and its Executive Board); a 
clear voting system (mainly ad personam voting – 
one member, one vote); a clear majority principle 
(simple majority); and a straightforward channel 
of accountability from the ECB to the European 
Parliament. Even if some of these features were 
contested at times and some ECB decisions were 
criticised, the ECB was always fully capable to act 
and even to take controversial decisions.
In other fields of euro area governance – fiscal policy, 
macroeconomic coordination, the monitoring of 
structural policies and the provision of conditional 
assistance – such institutional clarity is currently 
missing:
• There is no unified legal basis. The fact that the 
ESM and TSCG treaties are currently not part 
of community law implies that corresponding 
provisions fall outside the scope of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ).
• There is a confusion between the legislative and 
the executive functions of the Eurogroup. 
• As far as fiscal surveillance is concerned, there 
is no clear separation between the watchdog 
(prosecutor) and the political decision-taker 
(judge); the Commission and the Eurogroup 
share those roles. There are too many fora 
bringing together member states (Euro summits, 
ECOFIN, Eurogroup, ESM board) and a dizzying 
array of decision rules (unanimity, consensus, 
ESM supermajority, EU QMV, euro area QMV, 
reversed euro area QMV).
• There is too little clarity about which level of 
governance represents the EU interest, the 
euro area interest, and national interests. 
In particular, it is unclear if the President of 
Eurogroup is the guardian of the euro area 
interest or just a primus inter pares.
• There is a lack of clarity over the democratic 
control mechanisms. National parliaments are 
endowed with the ex-ante power to block ESM 
programmes, but the European parliament does 
not exercise ex post control.  
• There is a lack of clarity over who controls 
whom. Depending on the subject matter, 
principals and agents are trading places – in 
fiscal matters, the Commission is controlling 
member states, but as part of the Troika it serves 
as an agent of the Eurogroup.
This lack of clarity has had the effect of undermining 
transparency and accountability. New institutions 
have been created or developed out of mistrust in 
existing ones, rather than for functional reasons. 
In particular, the ESM owes in part its strength 
to a lack of trust in the European Commission. 
This leads to mission creep and turf battles. Trust 
is missing – in particular, many member states 
do not trust the Commission, and the European 
Parliament does not trust the Eurogroup or the 
ESM.  This weakens the overall governance system. 
The history of fiscal surveillance illustrates the 
problems associated with this situation. In the pre-
SGP era, the Commission enjoyed an assessment 
monopoly and was not bound by rules. In the 
late 1990s, the SGP was introduced to tie the 
hands of the Commission (its assessment leeway 
was largely removed), but the Eurogroup kept 
full freedom to decide whether or not to follow 
the recommendations of the Commission. In 
particular, it decided in 2003 to refrain from 
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stepping up the excessive deficit procedure for 
France and Germany, and to put the Stability 
and Growth Pact “in abeyance”. But in 2013 the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance 
(TSCG) introduced a reversed majority rule to 
limit the Eurogroup’s ability to depart from the 
Commission’s recommendations and submit the 
rules to political compromise. The result was that 
the Commission has now recovered major powers. 
Yet it is itself subject to political bargains among 
the member states. 
4.3.1	 Euro	area	surveillance	of	fiscal	and	economic	
policies 
On 6 December 2017, the Juncker Commission 
tabled a comprehensive package of institutional 
reforms, including a proposal to bring the TSCG 
and the ESM under community law, which 
would solve the legal heterogeneity problem. The 
Commission also proposed creating the office of a 
euro area finance minister.31 The minister would:
• serve as vice-president of the Commission and 
chair of the Eurogroup as well as the Board of 
governors of an upgraded European Stability 
Mechanism (see below – this is sometimes 
referred to as the future ‘European Monetary 
Fund’);
• oversee the implementation of the EU’s 
economic, fiscal and financial rules;
• pronounce on the adequate fiscal stance for the 
euro area as a whole;  
• oversee the use of EU and euro area budgetary 
instruments such as the structural funds; and
• represent the euro area externally.  
While we do not oppose the assignment of the chair 
of the council of ministers to a Commissioner – a 
model that is already used in the case of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security – we are opposed to merging the roles of 
prosecutor and judge, as this would violate basic 
principles of good governance. A clear delineation 
of roles, not only between the Commission, the 
Council and the European Stability Mechanism, 
but also between the watchdog/prosecutor and 
the political decision-maker, is an essential 
requirement of a stronger institutional system. In 
principle, three options can be envisaged: 
1. Strengthening the fiscal and macroeconomic 
watchdog role of the Commission, together with the 
establishment of a full-time Eurogroup president who 
is not simultaneously a member of a government. 
The problem with this option is that it would 
31 “A European Minister of Economy and Finance”, 
COM(2017)823, 6 December 2017. 
not depart significantly from the current model, 
as the Commission would continue to be a 
provider of both independent assessments and 
political compromises. It also carries the risk that 
the Eurogroup president would develop into 
a new bureaucracy (or expand the role of the 
ESM in support of the Eurogroup presidency), 
thereby creating a lasting institutional rivalry 
between the Commission and the Eurogroup 
presidency. 
2. Assigning the fiscal and macroeconomic watchdog 
role (the prosecutor) to an independent body (such 
as the European Fiscal Board or the ESM), together 
with the assignment of the Eurogroup presidency 
role (the judge) to the Commission (following the 
‘double-hat’ model in place for foreign policy). 
Such a system would provide institutional 
clarity and avoid new bureaucracies (albeit at 
the price of a large increase in the role and staff 
of either the European Fiscal Board or the ESM). 
However, it would require a major overhaul of 
the European Treaty, which currently explicitly 
assigns the fiscal and economic surveillance 
roles to the Commission.   
3. Splitting the two roles within the Commission, 
together with the establishment of a Chinese 
wall between the Commissioners and services 
in charge of the two roles. This would require 
assigning the fiscal and macroeconomic 
watchdog roles of the Commission to a special 
Commissioner who would bear exclusive 
responsibility for surveillance and the 
issuance of recommendations in accordance 
with the existing fiscal and economic rules. 
The exclusive character of this responsibility 
would be guaranteed by a special status within 
the Commission.32 The responsibility of this 
Commissioner would extend well beyond the 
current remit of the European Fiscal Board, 
which fulfils an exclusively advisory role. He 
or she would play the fiscal watchdog role 
envisaged by the reformed fiscal rules, and 
have responsibility for economic coordination 
procedures in accordance with the responsibility 
assigned to the Commission by the Treaty. 
Being relieved of the prosecutor role, the ECFIN 
Commissioner could then serve as Eurogroup 
President (‘double-hat’) and steer political 
decisions based on recommendations of the 
fiscal and economic watchdog. 
Both the second and the third model would be 
preferable to the first. Furthermore, from the point of 
view of ensuring the independence of the watchdog, 
the second model would be preferable to the third, 
32 Article 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission 
states that: “The President may assign to Members of the 
Commission special fields of activity with regard to which 
they are specifically responsible for the preparation of 
Commission work and the implementation of its decisions.”
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since protecting a fiscal watchdog located within 
the Commission from undue political interference 
would require a high degree of discipline. That 
said, there are precedents – in particular, in 
competition policy – that show that independent 
functions can be carried out successfully within 
the structure of the Commission. Furthermore, 
the third model has the advantage that it could 
be implemented without major treaty changes, 
as fiscal surveillance is currently a Community 
competence. Reassigning responsibilities currently 
assigned to the Commission would imply a much 
more fundamental overhaul of the existing legal 
architecture. 
4.3.2 Crisis management 
The responsibility for conditional assistance should 
be fully assigned to the ESM, with an expanded 
mandate and institutional framework: 
• It should take over from the Commission and the 
ECB the exclusive responsibility for the design 
and the negotiation of conditional assistance 
programmes. This would imply, as is de facto 
already the case, that the normal operation of 
fiscal and economic surveillance be suspended 
for the duration of the programme.33
• It should be subject to the political (but not 
financial) oversight of the European parliament. 
In practice, this would mean that the ESM 
Managing Director would be asked to explain 
and justify the design of ESM programmes to 
the relevant parliamentary committee. As long 
as funding for ESM assistance is provided by 
the member states, financial oversight, and the 
right to approve programmes, would remain in 
the hands of the ESM’s shareholders. 
• It should be governed by a sufficiently compact 
Board of Directors, appointed or elected by the 
members via an IMF-like constituency system. 
To increase the operational independence of the 
ESM, directors should operate at arm’s length 
from the governments that appoint them, as is 
formally the case for all Board members of the 
IMF (and de facto for board members elected by 
multi-country constituencies).34
33 This would apply to ‘standard’ ESM programmes. Countries 
that receive ESM loans based on pre-qualification and lighter 
ex post conditionality, as suggested in the section on fiscal 
instruments, would continue to participate in the standard 
surveillance process, complemented by ESM surveillance 
focused only on compliance with the conditions of the 
loan.
34 See Gianviti (1999) and Martinez-Diaz (2008), who 
compares the governance structure of the IMF to that of 
other international institutions.
5 Conclusion 
Building a monetary union of sovereign states is 
an ambitious endeavour, even when these states 
are closely integrated and already share common 
institutions. The crisis has simultaneously 
revealed the weaknesses of the euro area’s initial 
architecture, the strength of the member states’ 
and citizens’ commitment to its integrity, and the 
depth of disagreements over its reform. The task 
ahead is to embed the revealed collective preference 
for integration in institutional arrangements that 
are both robust and acceptable for all participating 
members. We think that this is a feasible task. 
Our proposal should be regarded as a package 
comprising six main elements: 
First, breaking the vicious circle between 
banks and sovereigns through the coordinated 
introduction of sovereign concentration charges 
for banks and a common deposit insurance. The 
former would incentivise the diversification of 
banks’ portfolios of government securities, while 
the latter would protect all insured euro area 
depositors equally. Incentives for prudent policies 
at the national level would be maintained by 
pricing country-specific risk in the calculation of 
insurance premiums, and through a reinsurance 
approach: common funds could be tapped only 
after ‘national compartments’ have been exhausted.  
Together, these measures would decisively reduce 
the remaining correlation between bank and 
sovereign risk, paving the way for the cross-border 
integration of banking and capital markets. In 
addition, mechanisms to bail in creditors of failing 
banks should to be strengthened, the reduction of 
existing non-performing loans needs to accelerate, 
and bank regulatory standards should be tightened 
and further harmonised. 
Second, replacing the current system of fiscal 
rules focused on the ‘structural deficit’ by a 
simple expenditure rule guided by a long-term 
debt-reduction target. A rule of this type is both 
less error-prone than the present rules and more 
effective in stabilising economic cycles, since 
cyclical changes in revenue do not need to be 
offset by changes in expenditure. Monitoring 
compliance with the fiscal rule should be devolved 
to national fiscal watchdogs supervised by an 
independent euro area-level institution. In case of 
no compliance, a government should be compelled 
to finance excess spending through the issuance of 
junior sovereign bonds, whose maturities would 
be automatically extended should the country be 
subject to an ESM programme.  
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Third, allowing orderly sovereign debt 
restructuring of countries whose solvency cannot 
be restored through conditional crisis lending – 
and hence a more credible no bailout rule. This 
requires lowering the economic and financial 
disruptions of a restructuring, adopting legal 
mechanisms that protect sovereigns from creditors 
that attempt to ‘hold out’ for full repayment, 
and developing ESM policies and procedures that 
provide an effective commitment not to bail out 
countries with unsustainable debts. To prevent any 
instability in sovereign debt markets, such policies 
need to be phased in gradually and combined with 
other reforms that reduce sovereign risk, such as 
common deposit insurance and fiscal risk-sharing 
mechanisms.
Fourth, creating a euro area fund, financed by 
national contributions, that helps participating 
member countries absorb large economic 
disruptions. Payouts would be triggered if 
employment falls below (or unemployment rises 
above) a pre-set threshold. To ensure that the system 
does not lead to permanent transfers, national 
contributions would be higher for countries 
that are more likely to draw on the fund, and 
revised based on ongoing experience. This system 
would maintain good incentives through three 
mechanisms: ‘first losses’ would continue to be 
borne at national level, participation in the scheme 
would depend on compliance with fiscal rules and 
the European semester, and higher drawings would 
lead to higher national contributions. 
Fifth, an initiative to create a synthetic euro area 
safe asset that would offer investors an alternative 
to national sovereign bonds. Safety could be 
created through a combination of diversification 
and seniority – for example, financial intermediaries 
would purchase a standardised diversified portfolio 
of sovereign bonds and use this as collateral for a 
security issued in several tranches. Introducing 
such assets in parallel with a regulation on limiting 
sovereign concentration risk would help smooth 
the transition away from excessive concentration 
on home-country government bonds.
Sixth, reform of the euro area institutional 
architecture. The role of the watchdog 
(‘prosecutor’) should be separated from that of 
the political decision-maker (‘judge’) by creating 
an independent fiscal watchdog within the 
European Commission (for example, a special 
Commissioner) or, alternatively, by moving the 
fiscal watchdog role outside the Commission. At 
the same time, the Eurogroup presidency role (the 
judge) could be assigned to the Commission. The 
policy responsibility for conditional crisis lending 
should be fully assigned to a crisis management 
institution built on the current ESM, with an 
appropriate accountability structure.
Implementing these reforms would be a game-
changer for the euro area, significantly improving 
its financial stability, political cohesion and 
potential for delivering prosperity to its citizens, 
all while addressing the priorities and concerns of 
the participating countries. Our leaders should not 
settle for less.  
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